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THE SECOND AMENDMENT:
AN ANALYSIS OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. HELLER
Eileen Kaufman*
Some years ago, few would have predicted that we would be
devoting a major segment of this conference to the Second Amend-
ment. But the year is 2008, and guns and the Second Amendment are
headline news, figuring prominently into electoral politics and pro-
ducing a landmark decision in which the Supreme Court held that the
Second Amendment protects an individual's right to bear arms, at
least in the home.
The case is District of Columbia v. Heller,1 a 154-page deci-
sion absolutely overflowing with sharply conflicting accounts of his-
tory and the principles of linguistics, not to mention competing views
on the meaning of earlier Supreme Court pronouncements regarding
the Second Amendment and the role of the courts in second-guessing
policy judgments made by the elected branches of government.2 Al-
though this was a truly historic decision that opens a whole new
chapter of constitutional law, it leaves open more questions than it re-
solves, and thus, invites many rounds of litigation for years to come.
3
* Professor Eileen Kaufman is a Professor of Law, Touro Law Center; B.A., Skidmore Col-
lege, 1970; J.D. New York University, 1975; L.L.M., New York University, 1991. This Ar-
ticle is based on a presentation given at the Twentieth Annual Leon D. Lazer Supreme Court
Review Program presented at Touro Law Center, Central Islip, New York.
128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
2 See id. at 2788-2870 (discussing the history and interpretations of the Second Amend-
ment).
3 Linda Greenhouse, Justices, Ruling 5-4, Endorse Personal Right to Own Gun, N.Y.
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The issue in the case was the constitutionality of Washington
D.C.'s gun control law, considered the strictest in the country.4 The
law prohibits the possession of handguns and requires that other fire-
arms in the home be disassembled or secured by a trigger lock.5 In
other words, the law requires that all firearms in the home be ren-
dered inoperable. The constitutionality of the law, of course, is de-
pendent on the larger issue of whether the Second Amendment pro-
tects an individual's right to bear arms, or, whether it only guarantees
the right to bear arms in connection with military service. The deci-
sion definitively resolved that question, finding the Second Amend-
ment does protect an individual's right to bear arms for personal use,
but it offers very little guidance as to what kind of restrictions the
government can place on that right. Additionally, it leaves unre-
solved the incorporation issue-whether the Second Amendment ap-
plies to the states or only to the federal government. That basic ques-
tion was not presented or resolved in Heller because at issue in Heller
was a D.C. law, and the District of Columbia is a federal enclave.
We must begin with the language of the Second Amendment,
which is rather tortured, plagued by commas and unusually placed
capital letters: "[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the se-
curity of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,
shall not be infringed.",6 Three distinct interpretations of the Second
Amendment have been advanced over the years: 1) the "individual
TIMES, June 27, 2008, at Al.
4 See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2788; D.C. CODE §§ 7-2501.01(12), 7-2502.01(a), 7-
2502.02(a)(4) (2001).
5 D.C. CODE § 7-2507.02 (1976).
6 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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rights" model, which holds that the Amendment guarantees to indi-
vidual citizens the right to possess firearms for any lawful purpose
subject to limited governmental regulation,7 a view not adopted by
any circuit court until 2001 ;8 2) the "limited individual rights" model,
also known as the "sophisticated collective rights" model, which
holds that the Amendment protects the individual's right to bear
arms, but only in connection with militia service; 9 and 3) the "collec-
tive rights" model, which holds that the Second Amendment protects
the right of the state to arm its militia (this is the model, that until
June 2008, dominated).10
As the headlines declared, the individual rights model
emerged from a sharply divided five-to-four Supreme Court last
term," with Justice Scalia writing what some consider to be his sin-
gle most significant opinion in twenty-two years on the bench. In-
deed, one commentator referred to it as "the magnum opus of Justice
Scalia's tenure on the Court.'
12
Justice Scalia analyzed virtually every one of the twenty-
seven words contained in the Second Amendment. He divided the
7 See Parker v. Dist. of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 379 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
8 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2823 n.2 ("Until the Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v. Em-
erson, 270 F.3d 203 (2001), every Court of Appeals to consider the question had understood
... that the Second Amendment does not protect the right to possess and use guns for...
civilian purposes.").
9 Robert A. Levy, Reviving the Second Amendment, CATO INST., Oct. 27, 2001,
http://www.cato.org/pub display/php?pub-id=3859.
1o Parker, 478 F.3d at 379.
See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Justices Reject D.C. Ban on Handgun Ownership-5-4 Ruling
Finds 1976 Law Incompatible With Second Amendment, WASH. POST, June 27, 2008, at AI
("The [C]ourt's landmark 5 to 4 decision split along ideological grounds and wiped away
years of lower court decisions that had held that the intent of the amendment, ratified more
than 200 years ago, was to tie the right of gun possession to militia service.").
12 Colloquy, Sizing up the 2007-08 Supreme Court Term, 31 LEGAL TIMES 9 (2008).
2009] 705
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text into its prefatory clause and its operative clause. 13 A lot of this is
linguistics, and indeed, Justice Scalia relied on an amicus brief sub-
mitted by professors of linguistics to conclude that the prefatory
clause-"[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to . . . a free
State"-merely announces a purpose. 14 In other words, it could be
rephrased as "because a well regulated Militia is necessary to the se-
curity of a free State." It states a purpose, but it does not control the
meaning of the operative clause. Justice Scalia relied on the rule of
construction that a preamble cannot control the enacting part of the
law, unless the enacting part is ambiguous. 5 He illustrated this point
by providing the following example: "[t]he separation of church and
state being an important objective, the teachings of canons shall have
no place in our jurisprudence."' 16 He said the prefatory clause would
be used to make clear that the word "canons" in the operative clause
refers to the canons of clergy as opposed to the canons of interpreta-
tion. 17 But the Second Amendment's operative clause contains no
comparable ambiguity, so the prefatory clause plays no role beyond
merely stating a purpose.
Justice Scalia then parsed the meaning of the operative clause:
"the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be in-
fringed." 18 He first addressed who is the holder of that right and
1" Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2789.
14 Id. See U.S. CONST. amend. II; Brief for Professors of Linguistics and English Dennis
E. Baron, Ph.D., et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (No.
07-290), 2008 WL 157194 at *3.
15 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2789.
16 Id.
17 Id.
"8 Id. at 2789-90; U.S. CONST. amend. II.
[Vol. 25
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concluded that "the right of the people" means the people as indi-
viduals, not as a collective.' 9 He then addressed the substance of the
right--"to keep and bear arms"-and concluded "keep and bear"
means to have and carry weapons outside of an organized militia z.2 It
protects the "individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of
confrontation.",21 What is the meaning of the word "arms"? "Arms"
means weapons and not just those designed for military use or in ex-
istence in the eighteenth century. "We do not interpret Constitutional
rights that way," Justice Scalia declared.2 If we did, then the First
Amendment would not apply to modem forms of communication,
and the Fourth Amendment would not apply to modem forms of
searches.23
Justice Scalia is characteristically sharply critical of the dis-
sent's interpretation, which would limit "bear arms" to the military
context. In fact, he devoted a substantial portion of his opinion refut-
ing the dissent's linguistic analysis, which, according to Justice
Scalia, is "unknown this side of the looking glass. 24
The majority relied not just on the text of the Second
Amendment, but also on history to support the conclusion that the
operative clause protects the individual right to bear arms.25 The his-
torical background of the Second Amendment is relevant, Justice
'9 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2790.
20 Id. at 2792.
21 Id. at 2797.
22 Id. at 2791-92 ("[T]he Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that
constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding.").
23 Id.
24 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2795.
25 Id. at 2797.
2009] 707
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Scalia explained, because like the First and Fourth Amendments, the
Second Amendment merely codified a pre-existing right.26 In this
portion of his opinion, he extensively reviewed centuries of history,
going back to the abuses of the Stuart Kings in the mid-seventeenth
century, kings who would select militias loyal to them to suppress po-
litical dissidents by disarming them.27 For example, King James II, a
Catholic, ordered the disarmament of his Protestant enemies. These
practices led to the assurance in 1689, which was eventually codified
in the English Bill of Rights, "[t]hat the subjects which are Protes-
tants may have arms for their defense suitable to their conditions and
as allowed by law., 28 Blackstone, who is extensively cited in the
opinion, later referred to this as "one of the fundamental rights of
Englishmen., 29 Indeed, a century later, American colonists reacted to
King George III's attempt to disarm them by relying on "their rights
as Englishmen to keep arms" for their own defense.3 °
The right that this history gave rise to, according to the major-
ity, was the right of the individual "to possess and carry weapons in
case of confrontation," an individual right, not a right confined to the
militia.3' Understood in this manner, the prefatory clause fits per-
fectly, because "history show[s] that the way tyrants had eliminated a
militia ... was not by banning the militia but simply by taking away
the people's arms, enabling a select militia or standing army to sup-
26 Id.
27 Id. at 2798 ("[T]he Stuart Kings Charles II and James II succeeded in using select mili-
tias loyal to them to suppress political dissidents, in part by disarming their opponents.").
28 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2798 (internal quotes omitted).
29 Id.
'0 Id. at 2799.
31 Id. at 2797.
708 [Vol. 25
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press political opponents. 32 The prefatory clause merely announces
the purpose for which the right was codified: to prevent elimination
of the militia. This interpretation is, according to the majority, also
supported by comparable provisions in state constitutions.33
The majority then exhaustively examined how the Second
Amendment had been interpreted in each era since its enactment and
concluded that the interpretation in every stage of history supported
the individual rights approach, with the exception of one lonely nine-
teenth century commentator who interpreted the Second Amend-
ment's right to bear arms as restricted to the militia.34
One aspect of this historical analysis I found particularly in-
teresting related to what went on in the post-Civil War period, when
there was considerable discussion of the Second Amendment as it re-
lated to the newly freed slaves.35 Many states, including, for exam-
ple, Kentucky and South Carolina, were disarming the recently freed
slaves. 36 Indeed, the 1866 Freedmen's Bureau Act included a provi-
sion that guaranteed the right to have full and equal benefit of all
laws, including the constitutional right to bear arms to all citizens
"without respect to race or color, or previous condition" of servi-
tude.37
Having concluded that linguistics and history both support an
individual rights model, Justice Scalia then analyzed whether the in-
32 Id. at 2801.
33 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2802-03 (noting Pennsylvania, Vermont, North Carolina, and
Georgia were among the first states to provide the individual with the right to bear arms).
14 Id. at 2807.
31 See id. at 2809-12.
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dividual rights interpretation is consistent with earlier Supreme Court
pronouncements.38 In what to me is the least convincing portion of
the majority opinion, Justice Scalia concluded that the individual
rights interpretation is fully consistent with precedent, even United
States v. Miller,39 a 1939 case widely viewed as rejecting the individ-
ual rights approach. In Miller, the Court upheld a federal conviction
for transporting an unregistered short-barreled shotgun in interstate
commerce in violation of the National Firearms Act.40 The Miller
Court rejected a Second Amendment challenge stating:
[i]n the absence of any evidence tending to show that
possession or use of a 'shotgun . . .' at this time has
some reasonable relationship to the preservation or ef-
ficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that
the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep
and bear such an instrument.4'
Justice Scalia read Miller as merely standing for the proposition that
the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically
possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, weapons such
as short-barreled shotguns.42 What about the "hundreds of judges"
who had read Miller quite differently, as rejecting the individual
rights approach? Justice Scalia believed they simply misread Miller,
and "their erroneous reliance upon an uncontested and virtually un-
reasoned case cannot nullify the reliance of millions of Americans..
38 See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2812-16.
3 307 U.S. 174 (1939). See also Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2813-14.
40 Miller, 307 U.S. at 174, 177, 183.
41 Id. at 178.
42 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at2814.
710 [Vol. 25
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• upon the true meaning of the right to keep and bear arms." 43
Justice Scalia also pointed out that it is not surprising the true
meaning of the Second Amendment has gone unresolved for so long,
because for most of our constitutional history, the Bill of Rights was
thought to be inapplicable to the states, and the federal government
rarely regulated "possession of firearms by law-abiding citizens."
Thus, "[fjor most of our history the question did not present itself., 44
That brings us to the District of Columbia statute and the
question of the extent to which the individual right to bear arms is
subject to state regulation. There is little dispute that the right is not
absolute, just as the right to free speech is not absolute, or the right to
reproductive freedom is not absolute. But, to what extent the Second
Amendment right to bear arms is subject to regulation is a question
that prompted a schism even among proponents of the individual
rights model. Paul Clement, the Solicitor General, took a position at
odds with other members of the Bush Administration, and he was
roundly criticized for it.45 He argued the Second Amendment permit-
ted reasonable regulation of firearms, for example, federal regulation
of machine guns, and the Court should not apply strict scrutiny to re-
view gun regulation.46 Unfortunately, the Court declined to provide
any meaningful guidance as to how to measure the constitutionality
of gun control laws, which means the litigation has only just begun.47
41 Id. at 2815 n.24.
44 Id. at 2816.
41 See id. at 2814.
46 Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Heller, 128 S. Ct.
2783 (No. 07-290), 2008 WL 157201 at *21, 24-25.
41 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821.
2009]
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Here is what the Court did say. First, the right secured by the
Second Amendment is not absolute. Indeed, nineteenth century
courts routinely upheld restrictions on the right, such as "prohibitions
on carrying concealed weapons.,, 48 The Court also indicated that the
following regulatory measures would all be constitutional: "prohibi-
tions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or
laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as
schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms., 49 But, we are given
absolutely no explanation of why those restrictions are constitutional
nor any standard by which we can determine what other regulations
would be constitutional.5 °
A second limitation on the right to bear arms, derived from
Miller, is that "the Second Amendment does not protect those weap-
ons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful pur-
poses.',51 This limitation has interesting implications. It means the
weapons most used in military service, weapons like M-16 rifles,
may be banned. These weapons are not protected by the Second
Amendment because they are not typically possessed by law-abiding
citizens for lawful purposes, even though they are most useful in
military service today. Does that not defeat the purpose expressed in
the Second Amendment's prefatory clause? If the purpose of the
Second Amendment is to prevent elimination of the militia, it is cer-
48 Id. at 2816.
41 Id. at2816-17.
50 See id. at 2846 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see id. at 2851 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
"' Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2815-16 (majority opinion).
712 [Vol. 25
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tainly rather anomalous to interpret the Amendment as not protecting
the weapons most likely to be used by a militia. Justice Scalia can-
didly acknowledged that his interpretation does indeed produce this
peculiar result.52 His response was merely to note that "the fact that
modem developments have limited the degree of fit between the
prefatory clause and the protected right cannot change our interpreta-
tion of the right.
5 3
What does this mean for the D.C. law? Remember, the ordi-
nance does two things: it prohibits handgun possession in the home,
and it requires other firearms in the home be rendered inoperable.
Both provisions violate the Second Amendment. The handgun pro-
hibition is unconstitutional because it is a wholesale prohibition of
the type of gun considered by the American people to be the quintes-
sential self-defense weapon, and "[t]he prohibition extends ... to the
home, where the need for defense of self, family, and property is
most acute. 54 The second provision requiring all "firearms in the
home be rendered and kept inoperable at all times" is also unconstitu-
tional because "[t]his makes it impossible for citizens to use [the
weapon] for the core lawful purpose of self-defense. 55
Although a considerable portion of the oral argument had
been devoted to the question of what governing standard should be
used to evaluate gun restrictions, the majority, unfortunately, de-
clined to announce what level of scrutiny applies; it did, however, re-
52 Id. at 2817.
53 Id.
14 Id. at 2817.
51 Id. at 2818.
2009]
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ject rational basis as the governing standard and reject Justice
Breyer's proffered interest-balancing approach.56 Justice Scalia ar-
gued that since this is the Court's first foray into the field we should
not expect the Court "to clarify the entire field., 57 This view reflects
the comment Justice Roberts made at oral argument: "[i]'m not sure
why we have to articulate some very intricate standard. . . . I don't
know why when we are starting afresh, we would try to articulate a
whole standard that would apply in every case?, 58
All we know for sure from this ground-breaking decision is
that laws that prohibit possessing loaded firearms in the home for
self-defense violate the Second Amendment; but, laws prohibiting
concealed weapons do not; laws prohibiting the possession of fire-
arms by felons and the mentally ill do not; laws forbidding guns in
schools and government buildings do not; and laws imposing condi-
tions and qualifications on commercial sale of arms do not. Further,
since Justice Scalia seems to have interpreted the Second Amend-
ment as not applying to weapons not customarily possessed by law-
abiding citizens, the federal ban on possessing machine guns would
presumably be upheld.
Let us spend a few minutes on the dissents. There were two:
one by Justice Stevens, focusing primarily on the meaning of the
56 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821 ("[The] 'interest-balancing inquiry' asks whether the statute
burdens a protected interest in a way or to an extent that is out of proportion to the statute's
salutary effects upon other important governmental interests.") (citations and internal quota-
tions omitted).
57 Id.
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Second Amendment; 59 and one by Justice Breyer, focusing exclu-
sively on the standard the Court should use in determining whether a
particular gun control law violates the Second Amendment.6 °
Justice Stevens wrote a vigorous dissent in which he said the
Second Amendment does not confer an individual right to bear arms,
but rather, it was "today's law-changing decision" that accomplished
this result.61 He characterized the majority's interpretation of the
Second Amendment as overwrought, novel, "strained and unpersua-
sive," and he said that "[e]ven if ... arguments on both sides of the
issue were evenly balanced," principles of stare decisis "would pre-
vent most jurists from endorsing such a dramatic upheaval in the
law."
62
Like Justice Scalia, Justice Stevens closely parsed the text of
the Second Amendment and painstakingly examined precedent and
history. Like Justice Scalia, Justice Stevens relied on state declara-
tions and constitutional provisions; but, unlike Justice Scalia, Justice
Stevens concluded that they show that the Second Amendment was
not meant to protect civilian use of weapons.63 For example, he
pointed to the declarations of rights of Pennsylvania and Vermont,
both of which expressly protect the civilian's "right to use firearms
for hunting or personal self-defense. 64 Justice Stevens also pointed
to the many formulations of the Second Amendment that James
59 See generally Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2822-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
60 See id. at 2847-70 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
61 Id. at 2846 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
62 Id. at 2823, 2824; see id. at 2826, 2828, 2831.
63 See id. at 2825, 2831.
64 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2825 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2009]
13
Kaufman: The Second Amendment: An Analysis of District of Columbia v. Hell
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2009
TOURO LA WREVIEW
Madison, its drafter, considered and rejected, including versions that
explicitly protected nonmilitary, civilian use of weapons.65 He relied
on a conscientious objector clause that Madison included in the origi-
nal draft of the Second Amendment as further evidence of the view
that the right to bear arms was limited to military service.66 To Jus-
tice Stevens, the history of the adoption of the Second Amendment
unmistakably demonstrated that the overriding concern that led to the
adoption of the Amendment was
the potential threat to state sovereignty that a federal
standing army would pose, and a desire to protect the
States' militias as the means by which to guard against
that danger. But state militias could not effectively
check the prospect of a federal standing army so long
as Congress retained the power to disarm them, and so
a guarantee against such disarmament was needed. 67
Thus, the historical analysis demonstrated that the framers of the
Second Amendment had a single purpose in mind-the preservation
of the militia-and the framers did not intend to limit the ability of
Congress to regulate the civilian use of weapons.
Justice Stevens criticized the majority for denigrating and ig-
noring the importance of the prefatory clause. He wrote:
[w]ithout identifying any language in the text that
even mentions civilian uses of firearms, the Court pro-
ceeds to "find" its preferred reading in what is at best
an ambiguous text, and then concludes that its reading
is not foreclosed by the preamble. Perhaps the Court's
65 Id. at 2835.
66 Id. at 2835-36.
67 Id. at 2836.
[Vol. 25
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approach to the text is acceptable advocacy, but it is
surely an unusual approach for judges to follow.68
Justice Stevens is also harshly critical of the Court's pro-
nouncement that the right " 'to keep and bear arms' " protects the
right in cases of confrontation, not the "right to possess arms for
'lawful, private purposes,' " which is how the D.C. Court of Appeals
had interpreted the Second Amendment.69 Justice Stevens stated,
"[n]o party or amicus urged this interpretation; the Court appears to
have fashioned it out of whole cloth., 70
He analogized Justice Scalia's word-for-word parsing of the
Second Amendment to the parable of the six blind men and the ele-
phant: a blind man touches one part and decides it is a tree, and an-
other man touches a different part and concludes it is a snake, and so
on.71 The point, of course, is a failure to fundamentally grasp the na-
ture of the beast. The nature of the Second Amendment the majority
failed to grasp, according to Justice Stevens, is that the Second
Amendment "secure[s] to the people a right to use and possess arms
in conjunction with service in a well-regulated militia."72
There are many sharp differences between the majority and
the dissent, but the most pointed concerns the meaning of Miller,
which as Justice Stevens pointed out, had been interpreted by courts
and commentators alike to signify a rejection of the individual rights
68 Id. at 2826.
69 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2828 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70 Id. at 2828.
"' Id. at 2831 n.14.
72 Id. at 2831.
2009]
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model of the Second Amendment.73 The majority's reinterpretation
of Miller, Justice Stevens said, represents a lack of "respect for the
well-settled views of all of our predecessors on this Court, and for the
rule of law itself.
74
Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion focused exclusively on the
question of how a Court should go about determining the constitu-
tionality of a particular firearm regulation.75 Assuming the Second
Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms, "what kind of
constitutional standard should the court use" in evaluating gun regu-
lations? 76  "How high a protective hurdle does the Amendment
erect?,
77
In an attempt to answer that question, he relied on historical
evidence showing gun regulation is consistent with the Second
Amendment. He described laws in effect in colonial times, which
significantly limited firearms in urban areas. New York City, for ex-
ample, imposed severe restrictions on how gunpowder could be
stored in the home.78
Ultimately, the standard Justice Breyer proposed was an in-
terest-balancing approach, similar to the analysis used in procedural
due process cases or cases involving government employees'
speech. 79 This analysis would balance competing interests and con-
71 See id. at 2822-23, 2839.
74 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2824 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71 See id. at 2850-55 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
76 Id. at 2851.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 2850 (citing Act of April 13, 1784, ch. 28, 1784 N.Y. Laws p. 627).
79 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2852-53 (supporting the use of an interest-balancing approach in
determining the constitutionality of the District of Columbia handgun law). See also
718 [Vol. 25
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sider whether there are less restrictive alternatives. Applying that ap-
proach to the DC law, Justice Breyer found that it was a proportion-
ate response to compelling life-preserving, public-safety interests
that did not disproportionately burden the interests which the Second
Amendment was designed to protect.80 To the extent that the Second
Amendment was primarily designed to preserve the militia, there is
absolutely nothing in the DC law that burdens that interest.81 The re-
spondent, Dick Heller, is 66 years old and even in the unlikely event
that the District of Columbia were to call upon its citizenry to form a
militia, respondent's service would not be requested. 82 A second in-
terest that arguably could be encompassed in the Second Amendment
is an interest in hunting. However, the DC law does not prohibit pos-
sessing rifles or shotguns, so that interest is not burdened. 83 What is
burdened by the DC law is the interest in keeping a loaded handgun
in the home for purposes of self-defense. Justice Breyer examined
whether there are less restrictive alternatives, and he concluded that
there are none, because what makes handguns so useful for self-
defense is precisely what makes them particularly dangerous.
8 4
Justice Breyer criticized the majority for severely limiting the
ability of democratically elected legislatures to deal with gun-related
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (utilizing an interest-balancing approach
in analyzing a procedural due process claim); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch.
Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (advancing an interest-balancing approach to ascertain
the constitutional limits of government employees' speech).
'0 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2861, 2865.
"' Id. at 2861.
82 Id. at 2861-62.
" Id. at 2863.
14 Id. at 2864.
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problems.8 5 He argued that courts should show more deference to
legislative judgment because of their better fact-finding capacity. He
said:
I can understand how reasonable individuals can dis-
agree about the merits of strict gun control as a crime-
control measure, even in a totally urbanized area. But
I cannot understand how one can take from the elec-
tive branches of government the right to decide
whether to insist upon a handgun-free urban populace
in a city now facing a serious crime problem and
which, in the future, could well face environmental or
other emergencies that threaten the breakdown of law
and order.
86
Finally, Justice Breyer described the unfortunate conse-
quences of the majority's decision. By failing to provide clear stan-
dards, the majority opinion "will encourage legal challenges to gun
regulation throughout the nation." 87  He said "litigation over the
course of many years, or the mere specter of such litigation, threatens
to leave cities without effective protection against gun violence and
accidents during that time. 88
What was the reaction to this historic decision? President
Bush and both presidential candidates expressed support for the deci-
sion.89 Indeed, both the Republican and Democratic platforms of




89 See Statement on the United States Supreme Court Ruling on Individual Gun Rights, 44
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 921 (June 26, 2008). President Bush declared: "As a longstand-
ing advocate of the rights of gun owners in America, I applaud the Supreme Court's historic
decision today confirming what has always been clear in the Constitution: the Second
[Vol. 25720
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2008 recognized the Constitutional right to bear arms, although the
two platforms offered radically different versions of the right.9° The
Republican platform specifically calls on the next president to ap-
point judges who will continue to respect the right, and who will op-
pose the federal licensing of law-abiding gun owners and national
gun registration as violative of the Second Amendment.9' The De-
mocratic platform embraces the right to bear arms as a part of the
American tradition, but emphasizes the importance of reasonable
regulations to keep communities safe.92
It has been less than four months since the Supreme Court an-
nounced the decision in Heller, but there have already been literally
dozens of cases where criminal defendants have attempted to have
their convictions reversed on the strength of Heller.93 In each case
thus far, the courts have rejected the Second Amendment argument.94
All of the following gun laws have been upheld against a Second
Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear firearms." Id. See also Cass R.
Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122 HARV. L REv. 246, 253,
263 (2007) (recognizing Barack Obama's and John McCain's general enthusiasm for the
Heller decision). Senator McCain said the decision was "a landmark victory for Second
Amendment freedom in the United States" that "ended forever the specious argument that
the Second Amendment did not confer an individual right to keep and bear arms." Posting
of Tom Bevan to Real Clear Politics,
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/politics-nation/2008/06/scotus-rules-for-guns.html (June
26, 2008) (last visited April 5, 2009). Senator Obama praised the Court for finding that the
right is not absolute, but is "subject to reasonable regulations enacted by local communities
to keep their streets safe." Id.
90 Compare 2008 Republican Platform-Values, http://www.gop.com/2008/Platform/
(last visited Jan. 31, 2008), with The 2008 Democratic National Platform: Renewing Amer-
ica's Promise, http://www.democrats.org/a/party/platform.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2008).
91 2008 Republican Platform, supra note 90.
92 2008 Democratic National Platform, supra note 90.
93 See, e.g., United States v. Guerrero-Leco, No. 3:08cr118, 2008 WL 4534226
(W.D.N.C. Oct. 6, 2008); United States v. Westry, No. 08-20237, 2008 WL 4225541 (E.D.
Mich. Sept. 9, 2008).
94 See, e.g., Guerrero-Leco, 2008 WL 4534226, at *1; Westry, 1008 WL 4225541, at * 2.
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Amendment attack: a law prohibiting possession of a firearm within a
thousand feet of a school; 95 a law prohibiting felons from possessing
guns;96 a law prohibiting gun possession by persons who have been
convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence; 9 a law pro-
hibiting gun possession on federal postal property;98 a law prohibiting
possessing guns by an individual subject to an order of protection in-
volving domestic abuse;99 a law prohibiting the possession of a
sawed-off shotgun; 0 a law criminalizing traffic in stolen firearms; 10 1
and a law prohibiting carrying a concealed weapon without a per-
Mi.102mit. 1°
One case, a little out of the ordinary because it actually in-
volved a militia, is United States v. Fincher,10 3 where the Eighth Cir-
cuit held the Second Amendment does not extend to machine guns or
sawed-off shotguns used in connection with an unsanctioned mili-
tia. 104  The defendant, Fincher, was convicted of violating federal
statutes which prohibit the possession of unregistered sawed-off
95 See United States v. Lewis, No. 2008-45, 2008 WL 5412013 (D.V.I. Dec. 24, 2008)
(prohibiting possession near school zone).
96 See United States v. Abner, No. 3:08cr51-MHT, 2009 WL 103172 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 24,
2009) (prohibiting possession by felons).
97 See United States v. Lippman, No. 4:02-cr-082, 2008 WL 46641514 (D.N.D. Oct. 20,
2008) (prohibiting possession where there is a domestic violence restraining order).
98 See United States v. Dorosan, No. 08-042, 2008 WL 2622996 (E.D. La. June 30, 2008)
(prohibiting possession on postal property).
99 See United States v. White, No. 07-00361-WS, 2008 WL 3211298 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 6,
2008) (prohibiting possession in domestic violence situations).
1oo See United States v. Fincher, 538 F.3d 868 (8th Cir. Aug 13, 2008) (prohibiting pos-
session of sawed-off shotgun).
101 See LaRoche v. United States, Nos. CV 407-054, CR402-234, 2008 WL 4222081
(S.D. Ga. Sept. 15, 2008) (criminalizing the traffic in stolen firearms).
102 See United States v. Davis, No. 05-50726, 2008 WL 4962926 (9th Cir. Sept. 10, 2008)
(prohibiting concealed weapon).
'03 538 F.3d at 868.
104 Fincher, 538 F.3d at 873-74.
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shotguns and machine guns. 105 Fincher argued that his possession of
those weapons was in connection with his membership in the Wash-
ington County Militia, a group that he helped found for the ostensible
reason of assisting local law enforcement, though he had been unsuc-
cessful in obtaining approval or any official sanction of the militia.0 6
The Eighth Circuit rejected his Second Amendment challenge, find-
ing that (a) his gun possession was not reasonably related to a well-
regulated militia, since the Washington County Militia was an unor-
ganized militia, and (b) drawing on Heller, since machine guns are
not in common use by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, they
are not within the protection of the Second Amendment.'0 7
Clearly, gun control laws are at risk after Heller. A Chicago
ordinance, which is considered the second strictest after Heller, bans
the possession of handguns acquired after 1983 and requires the re-
registration of older guns every two years. A challenge to the Chi-
cago law, McDonald v. City of Chicago,'°8 was filed hours after the
Heller decision was announced and that case directly presents the in-
corporation issue. In fact, Alan Gura, the same attorney who repre-
sented Heller, has said he is ready for that fight; McDonald is the
case to resolve that.'0 9 Many Chicago suburbs also ban handgun pos-
session, but most of those towns repealed their bans in the aftermath
of Heller in an effort to avoid costly litigation." 0 Toledo, Ohio also
105 Id. at 870.
106 Id. at 871-72.
117 See id. at 872-74.
118 No. 08C3645, 2008 WL 5111112 (N.D. I11. Dec. 4, 2008).
109 Interview by Glenn Beck with Alan Gura, in Washington, D.C. (June 26, 2008).
110 See Christopher Keleher, District of Columbia v. Heller: The Death Knell for Illinois
Handgun Bans?, 96 ILL. B.J. 402, 406 (2008).
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has a gun control law that may be vulnerable after Heller." 1
The bottom line is that Heller is truly a landmark decision, but
one certain to usher in a new era of gun litigation. The first round
will be devoted to the question of incorporation-the threshold ques-
tion that the Supreme Court will ultimately resolve. What follows, I
suspect, will be litigation throughout the nation attempting to tackle
the thornier question of how to evaluate the constitutionality of fire-
arm regulations. What standard should the courts use? How deferen-
tial should the courts be to legislative fact-finding? Although the Su-
preme Court ducked that issue in Heller, it is only a matter of time
until the Court will have to establish the standard used to evaluate
governmental regulation of firearms.
... See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2865.
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